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ABSTRACT 
The paper aims at illustrating a procedure for the lightning 
risk assessment of industrial oil process plants. The 
procedure is based on the use of the Monte Carlo method 
and applies to each event both a lightning attachment 
criterion and a damage calculation model. In particular, for 
the case of oil tanks, the model calculates the expected 
annual number of damages associated to the metal melting 
due to direct lightning events. The paper also presents and 
discusses an application example of the proposed procedure. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Storage facilities, which may be at chemical plants or 
in other storage terminals, contain large quantities of 
chemicals. The prevention of loss in storage is therefore 
extremely important. Lightning strokes that hit storage or 
process vessels containing flammable materials can cause 
devastating accidents. In recent years, several accidents 
have occurred where lightning has struck facilities 
handling flammable substances, resulting in explosions 
and fires [1,2]. 
The assessment of the risk associated to lightning 
events is a typical calculation for industrial process plants 
(e.g. [3-7]). Such an assessment is of particular 
importance for the case of chemical and process industry, 
where it might be compulsory by legislation, at least in 
most European countries. 
The calculation is usually carried out by using 
probabilistic approaches in which the annual number of 
influencing flashes, the probability of damage by one of 
the influencing flashes and the mean amount of 
consequential loss due to one flash need to be evaluated 
(e.g. [3,8,9]). 
With reference to the case of an oil tank plant, the 
probability of damage appears to be mainly related to the 
following lightning parameters: current peak value Ip,  
maximum di/dt and total charge Q. These parameter are 
associated with the appearance of hot spots in the 
metallic structure of the tanks, of induced voltages and 
with melting phenomena, as shown by specific numerical 
models and experimental tests (e.g. [10,11]). 
Moreover, the current peak value plays a decisive role 
on the usual attachment models [12] and therefore is also 
taken into account in order to evaluate the probability of 
direct strokes to a structure. 
The paper presents a statistical procedure that is based 
on Monte Carlo simulations and applies the 
electrogeometric model and a damage calculation model 
to the metal melting of the oil tanks due to direct strikes.  
In this paper, the damage model is limited to 
comparison between the expected melting caused the 
thermal heating and the shell thickness in order to 
provide a first evaluation of the annual expected number 
of punctures for each of the tanks. The developed 
procedure appears to be able to incorporate different or 
more accurate damage models without a significant 
change of its structure. 
The structure of the paper is the following: section 2 
illustrates the typical layout of oil tank farms, section 3 
describes the proposed procedure, section 4 presents the 
application example to a specific set of oil tanks, section 
5 illustrates the effects of the presence of protection rods 
and wires and section 6 is devoted to the conclusions. 
2 OIL PLANT TANK FARMS 
The main types of storage tanks and vessels for liquids 
and liquefied gases are (1) atmospheric and low pressure 
storage tanks, (2) pressurized storage vessels, and (3) 
refrigerated (cryogenic) storage tanks.  
For each type of storage tanks there are standard 
geometries that correlates the volume capacity with the 
dimensions (diameter and height for the cylindrical 
vessels). 
A number of standards and codes may be applied to 
the storage of petroleum products and flammable liquids. 
Standards and codes include API Std 620 [13] and Std 
650 [14], NPFA 30 [15] and the Refining Safety Code of 
the IP [16]. 
For liquid storage, it is common to segregate the 
liquids stored according to their class, related to the flash 
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point value. There are a large number of standards, codes 
of practice and other publications which give minimum 
safe separation distances. The guidance available [17] 
relates mainly to separation distances for storage, either 
of petroleum products, of flammable liquids, of liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) or of liquefied flammable gas 
(LFG). 
The layout of tanks, as distinct from their spacing, 
should always take into consideration the accessibility 
needed for fire-fighting and the potential value of a 
storage tank farm in providing a buffer area between 
process plant and public roads, houses, etc., for safety 
reasons. The location of tanks relevant to process units 
must be such as to ensure maximum safety from possible 
incidents. The distance between individual tanks in the 
group is mainly governed by constructional and operating 
convenience, unless safety issues are relevant. Tank 
distances are however never lower than 2 m. 
3 METHODOLOGY FOR THE CALCULATION 
OF THE LIGHTNING STRIKE 
PROBABILITY AND DAMAGE 
3.1 Lightning strike probability calculation 
The paper adopts the Monte Carlo method, already 
proposed for the evaluation of the assessment of 
overhead line indirect lightning performance [18], as it 
allows a straightforward comparison between results 
obtained by using different statistics of lightning 
parameters, different lightning attachment models and 
different damage calculation methods in order to evaluate 
direct and indirect lightning effects.  
In what follows, we describe the steps of the proposed 
numerical procedure for the calculation of the lightning 
strike probability of oil tanks. 
a. A large number of events ntot is randomly generated, 
each event i being characterized by five parameters: 
lightning current amplitude Ip and front time tf, 
impulse charge Q and stroke location coordinates x 
and y. Parameter Ip, tf and Q of the randomly 
generated events are assumed to follow the Cigré 
log-normal probability distributions [19,20] for 
downward negative first strokes1. The stroke 
locations are assumed to be uniformly distributed 
within an area A that contains the entire oil tank 
farm and it is wide enough in order to take into 
account all the events that may hit a tank. 
b. For each of the randomly generated events i, the 
                                                 
1 Namely, median value µIp’=61.1kA and standard deviation of 
the natural logarithm σIp’=1.33 for Ip ≤20kA, µIp’’=33.3kA and 
σIp’’=0.605 for Ip >20kA, µtf=3.83µs and σtf=0.553 for tf, 
µQ=4.65As and σQ=0.875 for Q, with a correlation coefficient 
between the distributions of Ip and tf equal to 0.45 and between 
Ip and Q equal to 0.77. 
procedure determines whether the specific event is 
collected by one of the structures that compose the 
oil farm. Each oil tank t has been represented by a 
solid cylinder with polygonal cross section and with 
flat roof. As a first approximation, the lightning 
incidence is assessed by means of the 
electrogeometric lightning incidence model (EGM) 
adopted by IEEE Std. (e.g. [21])2. Lightning event i 
is considered a direct lightning to the oil tank t if in 
its vertical approaching to ground it encounters a 
point characterized by a distance from the nearest 
point k that belongs to the upper corner of tank t 
lower than the so called critical distance and this 
condition has not been previously met for any other 
structure or the ground itself. The typical equation 
for the calculation of the critical distance to the 
corner points rs is: 
 0.65p10sr I=        (1) 
For the critical distance rg to flat surfaces (ground 
and roofs) we adopt 
 s0.9gr r=        (2) 
Several inception models have been presented in the 
literature, more physically based than the 
electrogeometrical one, adopted in this study. 
c. If n(t) is the number of events that result to be 
collected by tank t, the expected annual number of 
direct strokes to tank t is obtained from the 
following expression: 
 ( )d g
tot
n tF N A
n
=        (3) 
where Ng is the annual ground flash density (in km-1 
yr-1). 
d. For each of oil tank t, each direct lightning event is 
characterized by a specific current amplitude and 
charge. This set of events is then used for the 
application of the damage model, as described in 
section 3.3. 
3.2 Application of the procedure for the calculation 
of the strike annual frequency calculation to a 
cylindrical structure 
As vertical cylindrical steel tanks, with fixed or 
floating roof, are often used at petroleum product storage 
centers and refineries, we illustrate here the application of 
the procedure for the calculation of the annual number of 
direct strikes to a cylindrical structure. 
                                                 
2 Other, more accurate, models for exposure of grounded 
objects to direct lightning strokes have been proposed in the 
literature and may be implemented in the proposed procedure 
(e.g., [22-25]). An analysis of the striking distance to ground is 
reported in [26]. 
 1497-3
We consider three different tank sizes: a tank with a 
base diameter equal to 15 m and height equal to 6 m 
(Tank 1), a tank with diameter equal to 10.7 m and height 
equal to 9 m (Tank 2) and a tank with both diameter and 
height equal to 7.5 m (Tank 3). By using a set of 500 000 
randomly generated events, Fig. 1 shows the perspective 
stroke locations (i.e. stroke locations at ground without 
the presence of the tank) relevant to the lightning events 
that hit Tank 1 according to the adopted EGM (the 
figures relevant to Tank 2 and Tank 3 are similar). 
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Fig. 1 - Top view of the perspective stroke locations of the 
events that strike Tank 1. 
For isolated structures, often the expected annual 
number of direct strikes Fd is expressed by the product 
between the flash density Ng and a collection area Ad of 
the structure (e.g. IEC standard 62305-2 [27]). Table I 
shows the values of the annual frequency for Tank 1, 
Tank 2, and Tank 3 calculated by using the Monte Carlo 
approach for the case of Ng = 3 flashes/km/yr and the 
corresponding Ad values. 
Table I – Annual number of direct strokes Fd and collection 
area Ad values calculated for the case of Tank 1 and Tank, 
assuming Ng=3 flashes/km/yr. 
Tank 
no. 
Fd 
(strokes/km2/year) 
Calculated 
Ad value 
(km2) 
Ad value 
according to 
[27] 
1 0.042 0.014 0.002 
2 0.045 0.015 0.003 
3 0.040 0.013 0.002 
 
Table I also shows the Ad values obtained by using the 
criterion proposed in [27], namely the area of the cylinder 
base augmented by a band large three times the value of 
the cylinder height. These Ad values are significantly 
lower than those calculated. The difference reduces if 
higher cylinders are considered and similar results would 
be obtained for a cylinder height of 27 m (Ad= 0.025 km2 
for a diameter equal to 15 m, Ad= 0.024 km2 for a 
diameter equal to 10.7 m, and Ad= 0.023 km2 for a 
diameter equal to 7.5 m). For higher height values the 
calculated values are lower than those obtained by 
applying the criterion of standard [27]. By varying the 
diameter value, with a constant height equal to 27 m, the 
variations of the calculated Ad values are in agreement 
with those of standard [27]. 
3.3 Damage calculation 
For each of the direct lightning events, the damage 
calculation model is applied to determine whether the 
event i is able to produce a dangerous metal melting of 
the oil tank t. Therefore, for each oil tank it is possible to 
express the risk of damage. 
The main effects of a direct stroke to a metallic storage 
tank are the appearance of hot spots on the rear surface 
and the melting process.  
Thermal effects linked with lightning current are 
relevant to the resistive heating caused by the circulation 
of an electric current flowing through the resistance of 
the conductor. Thermal effects are also relevant to the 
heat generated in the root of the arcs at the attachment 
point and in all the isolated parts involved in arc 
development (e.g. spark gaps). An analytical approach to 
evaluate the temperature rise of conductors subjected to 
the flow of a lightning current is presented in IEC 
standard [27]. 
In a lightning discharge, the high specific energy 
phases of the lightning flash are too short in duration for 
any heat generated in the structure to be dispersed 
significantly. The phenomenon is therefore to be 
considered adiabatic and the temperature of the 
conductors can be evaluated as follows: 
 0
0 2
1 exp 1
w
W
R
q c
αρ
θ θ α γ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− = −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (4) 
where: 
θ-θ0   temperature rise of the conductors (°K); 
α        temperature coefficient of the resistance (1/°K); 
W/R   specific energy of the current impulse (J/Ω); 
ρ0    specific ohmic resistance of the conductor at 
ambient temperature (Ωm); 
q       cross-section area of the conductor (m2); 
γ        material density (kg/m3); 
Cw     thermal capacity (J/kg °K). 
 
Attachment point thermal damage can be observed on 
all components of an equipment item on which an arc 
development takes place. Material melting and erosion 
can occur at the attachment point. In fact, in the arc root 
area there is a large thermal input from the arc root itself, 
as well as a production of heating due to the high current 
densities. Most of the thermal energy is generated at or 
very close to the surface of the metal. The heat generated 
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in the immediate root area is in excess of that which can 
be absorbed into the metal by conduction and the excess 
is irradiated or lost in melting or vaporizing of metal. The 
severity of the process is linked to the current amplitude 
and to the duration. 
Several theoretical models have been developed for the 
calculation of thermal effects on metal surfaces at the 
attachment point of a lightning channel. For sake of 
simplicity, IEC standard [27] reports only the anode-or-
cathode voltage drop model. The application of this 
model is particularly effective for thin metal skins. In all 
cases, it gives conservative results as it postulates that all 
the energy injected in the lightning attachment point is 
used to melt or vaporize conductor material, neglecting 
the heat diffusion within the metal. Other models 
introduce the dependence of the lightning attachment 
point damage on the duration of the current impulse. 
The energy input W at the arc root is assumed as given 
by the anode/cathode voltage drop ua,c multiplied by the 
charge Q of the lightning current: 
 , , ,a c a c a c
W u idt u idt u Q= = =∫ ∫  (5) 
As ua,c is fairly constant in the current range considered 
here, the charge of the lightning current (Q) is primarily 
responsible for the energy conversion in the arc root. The 
anode-or-cathode voltage drop ua,c has a value of a few 
tens of volts. A simplified approach assumes that all of 
the energy developed at the arc root is used only for 
melting. Equation  (6) uses this assumption and leads to 
an overestimate of the melted volume: 
 
, 1
( )
a c
w s u s
u Q
V
C cγ θ θ= − +
  
(6) 
where 
V is the volume of metal melted (m3); 
ua,c is the anode-or-cathode voltage drop (assumed as 
constant) (V); 
Q is the charge of the lightning current (C); 
γ is the material density (kg/m3); 
Cw is the thermal capacity (J/kg°K); 
θs is the melting temperature (°C); 
θu is the ambient temperature (°C); 
cs is the latent heat of melting (J/kg). 
 
Basically, the charge to be considered is the sum of the 
charge of the return stroke and the lightning continuing 
current. Laboratory experience has revealed that the 
effects of the return stroke charge may be of minor 
importance when compared to the effects of the 
continuing current [11]. 
If a section of a tank receives a lightning discharge, the 
resulting current will heat the attachment point. If the 
metal is homogeneous, the current will heat a 
hemispherical volume [7]. The melted volume on the 
attachment point is calculated by (6), using the charge 
value provided by Monte Carlo simulation. In this way, 
the vessel puncture is assessed by the comparison 
between the radius of the hemispherical melted volume 
and the wall thickness. By using an expression analogous 
to (3), in which n(t) is replaced by the number of events 
that cause a puncture in tank t, the expected annual 
number of punctures in each tank is finally estimated. 
4 APPLICATION EXAMPLE 
In the following, a case-study of realistic complexity 
relevant to an oil storage plant is described, in order to 
illustrate the various aspects of the proposed procedure. 
The application example makes reference to the 27-
tanks storage plant, the top view of which is shown in 
Fig. 2. The geometrical characteristics of each tank are 
given in Table II. 
 
Fig. 2 - Top view of the considered oil plant. 
Table II - Dimensions of the structures of Fig. 2. 
Type of 
Structure 
Volume
(m3) 
Height 
(m) 
Diameter 
(m) 
Thickness 
(mm) 
AT_A_x 1000 6 15 7 
AT_B_x 750 9 10.7 7 
T0x 250 7.5 7.5 5 
 
The first step of proposed approach is the Monte Carlo 
event generation and the application of the inception 
model (1) and (2). Fig. 3 shows the perspective stroke 
locations at ground of the direct strokes to a tank, 
obtained for 100 000 events whose perspective stroke 
locations are uniformly distributed in an area A of 
1.7 km. 
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Fig. 3 - Top view the perspective stroke location of the Monte 
Carlo events that hit a tank of Fig. 2. Each stroke location is 
colored so to indicate a different affected tank. 
Assuming Ng=3 flashes/km/yr, Fig. 4 shows the 
calculated expected annual number of direct strokes to 
one of the tanks. The figure also shows the same values 
obtained for reduced and enlarged distances between 
neighboring tanks by 25% with respect to the distances of 
Fig. 2.  
To each event, the damage model described of (5) is 
applied, being known the Q of the event and assuming 
the following values for the other parameters: ua,c=30V, 
γ=8000 kg/m3, CW=500 J/kg°K, θs=1500°C, θu=25°C, 
cs=0. Table III shows the expected annual number of 
punctures for the three different cases analyzed in Fig. 4, 
namely the layout of Fig. 2 and for the cases of reduced 
and enlarged distances between neighboring tanks by 
25%. For the tanks not listed in the table, the calculation 
provides a zero expected number of punctures. The 
expected annual number equal to 0.05 10-3 corresponds to 
one event that cause a puncture over the total number of 
100 000 events.  
Table III – Expected annual number to punctures for the layout 
of Fig. 2 and for reduced and enlarged distances between 
neighboring tanks by 25%. 
Tank  Layout of 
Fig. 2 
Enlarged 
distances 
Reduced 
distances 
T02 0.103 10-3 0.105 10-3 0.102 10-3 
T04 0.052 10-3 0 0.051 10-3 
T06 0 0.052 10-3 0 
T08 0.052 10-3 0.052 10-3 0.051 10-3 
T12 0.207 10-3 0.210 10-3 0.153 10-3 
T14 0.258 10-3 0.262 10-3 0.255 10-3 
 
The results of Table III are justified by the fact that 
tanks of type T0x are those characterized by the lowest 
thickness value (as shown by Table II) and the tanks of 
the table are those characterized by higher level of 
expected annual number of direct strokes with respect to 
the other tanks of the same type.  
The risk associated to the values of Table III does not 
take into account other effects that direct strokes to a tank 
may cause even without a perforation of the tank wall 
(e.g. the local thermal effects). 
5 INFLUENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF RODS 
AND WIRES 
In order to illustrate the effects of the presence of 
protecting rods and wires, we have repeated the 
calculation of the expected annual number of direct 
strokes and the expected annual number of punctures for 
the following three simple configurations: 
a) four 20m high rods at the corners of the area occupied 
by the tanks; 
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Fig. 4 – Expected annual number of direct strokes to one of the tanks for the layout of Fig. 2 and for reduced and enlarged distances 
between neighboring tanks by 25%. 
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b)  additional rod in the middle of the area. 
c)  as case a) with additional four 15m high overhead 
wires connecting the four rods and surrounding the 
area. 
The calculation does not consider the possibility of a 
back flashover between the rods or wires and the tanks 
and neglects the presence the poles used to sustain the 
wires. Fig. 5 shows the perspective stroke location of the 
Monte Carlo events that hit a tank for each of the 
considered configurations. The corresponding expected 
number of direct strokes to each of the tanks is shown in 
Fig. 6. 
For all of the considered cases with the addition of 
rods and wires, the calculation with 100 thousands of 
events does not show punctures. 
If two additional wires that cross in the middle of the 
area are also included in configuration c), only for tank 
AT_B_3 a non-null expected annual number of direct 
strokes is obtained (0.052 10-3). 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study a procedure for the assessment of the 
industrial risk due to lightning events is proposed. 
The procedure is based on a Monte Carlo simulation 
and applies to each event both a lightning attachment 
mopdel and a damage calculation model. As the assumed 
models does not require a significant calculation effort, 
the simulation is carried out for 100 thousands of events. 
For the typical extension of indlustrial plants (few km2), 
such a number appears to be adequate to achieve an 
acceptable confidence level for the estimated annual 
number of direct strikes and damages. 
The developed procedure requires a limited amount of 
additional data with respect to those used in a 
conventional risk analysis and allows the quantitative 
assessment of the risk due to lightning strikes on each 
equipment item. In particular, the capability to estimate 
the risk associate to severe scenarios triggered by 
lightning involving dangerous substances that may be 
present in chemical and process plants appears to be of 
peculiar importance. 
The developed procedure appears to be able to 
incorporate different or more accurate damage models 
than the one relevant to the calculation of the number of 
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Fig. 6 – Expected annual number of direct strokes to one of the tanks for the layout of Fig. 2 for the considered three configurations of protecting 
rods and wires. 
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punctures adopted in this paper, without a significant 
change of its structure. 
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